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Abstract 
This is a translation into English of the Dizionario gramsciano entry “Philology” by Ludovico De Lutiis. 
Philology, the “methodological expression of the importance of particular facts”, underlies Gramsci’s 
writings in the Notebooks and lies at the centre of various reflections; it is indispensable for 
reconstructing an author’s thought and, indeed, the past. Gramsci drew inspiration for his own anti-
positivist approach, con-trasted to that of Bukharin, in part from Ernst Bernheim’s outline of historical 
method . Reading a text or situation, and knowing how not to read too much into it (a refusal to 
“importune” [sollecitare] the text), is essential to objective, dispassionate understanding. In these terms 
the interpretation of the present is “living philology”, where “human nature is the totality of historically 
determined social relations”. This “philology of history and politics” form part of Gramsci’s critique of 
determinist Marxism. Through the interpretation of a situation by a “collective organism”, i.e. through 
“living philology”, the essential link is formed “between great mass, party and leading group” in order to 
“move together as ‘collective-man’”. 
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Philology (Filologia): Gramsci  Dictionary 
 
Ludovico De Lutiis 
 
 
Gramsci names philology as the subject of his university studies 
only on very rare occasions, always in his Prison Letters and always en 
passant. The lemma often however acquires a value in other types of 
conceptual contexts and in the Notebooks the philological method is 
at the centre of various reflections. The starting point for these 
reflections is often Gramsci’s hostility to those who “importune the 
texts”, which for him means that  
 
out of zealous attachment to a thesis one makes texts say more than they 
really do. This error of philological method occurs also outside of  philology in 
studies and analyses of all aspects of life. In terms of criminal law, it is 
analogous to selling goods at lesser weight and of different quality than had 
been agreed upon, but it is not considered a crime unless the will to deceive is 
glaringly obvious. But don’t negligence and incompetence deserve to be 
sanctioned – if not a judicial sanction, at least an intellectual and moral 
sanction.1  
 
These considerations may be compared with others found in the 
Notebooks and Prison Letters: “there is no doubt that one can find 
whatever one wants in the past by manipulating points of view and 
the system of yardsticks and values” (Q3§62, pp. 341-2; PN Vol. 2, 
p. 61); “I believe that inspiration should be dropped into a ‘ditch’ 
and instead one should apply the method taught by the most 
particularized experience and the most dispassionate or objective 
self-criticism”.2 Philology is then for Gramsci an indispensable tool 
for defending the objectivity of the reconstruction of the past and, 
especially, of the thought of an author; it must be accompanied by a 
                                                 
1 “Sollecitare i testi”: cf. Q6§198, p. 838 of the Gerratana critical edition of the Quaderni del 
carcere, Torino: Einaudi, 1975 (henceforward notebook and paragraph number and, in one case, 
subsection of the paragraph, followed by the page number, are cited in the text); in English this 
paragraph is “Importuning the texts”, Prison Notebooks (henceforward PN, followed by volume 
and page number in the text), ed. and trans. J. A. Buttigieg, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1992, 1996 and 2007: here Vol. 3 (2007), p. 141. 
2 Critical edition of the Lettere dal carcere, ed. F. Giasi, with appendices by M.L. Righi: Torino, 
Einaudi 2020, p. 122. Gramsci’s letter is dated 4 July 1927, and addressed to Giuseppe Berti: 
see in English Letters from Prison, ed. F. Rosengarten and trans. R. Rosenthal, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 119. 




series of technical capacities that contribute to the use of a method 
that permits one (or at least attempts to permit one) to have the 
texts express exclusively what is contained in them. Many of these 
judgmental capacities are the object of reflection regarding the 
reconstruction of Marx’s thought that Gramsci set as an aim; such 
would be the fruit “of detailed work […] conducted with the most 
scrupulous accuracy and scientific honesty” (Q4§1, p. 419; PN Vol. 
2 [1996], p. 137).3 A number amongst the various points listed are 
of a characteristically philological nature:  
 
One should also study and analyze the work of elaboration that the author 
performed on the material of the works he subsequently published; at the very 
least, such a study would provide clues for the critical evaluation of the reli-
ability of the versions if the unpublished works edited by others. The further 
removed the preparatory material for the published works is from the definit-
ive text composed by the author himself, the less reliable is the version of that 
kind of material edited by a different person (Q4§1, p. 420; PN Vol. 2, p. 138).4  
 
As well as fostering the philological method and historio-
graphical impartiality in the study of the past, in Gramsci the 
concept of philology plays a significant role in the definition of 
“living philology”. The two spheres are, moreover, connected and 
an important trait d’union is provided by the background to each of 
Gramsci’s reflections on the theory of history, the historicization of 
the concept of “human nature”:  
 
The basic innovation introduced by the philosophy of praxis into the 
science of politics and of history is the demonstration that there is no abstract 
‘human nature’, fixed and immutable […] but that human nature is the totality 
of historically determined social relations, hence an historical fact which can, 
within certain limits, be ascertained with the methods of philology and 
criticism (Q13§20, pp. 1598-9; SPN, p. 133). 
  
It is through this lens that we have to read the polemic with 
Croce’s interpretation of the concept of “structure”, conceived of 
                                                 
3 In the rewritten text (Q16§2, pp. 1840-1) Gramsci indeed adds the word “philological” 
before “detailed” (“minuzioso”), not present in the first draft text, here quoted from Q4. 
4 The rewritten text of Q16§2 is structurally rearranged somewhat as compared with the first 
draft text and qualifies “study and analyse” with “minute” (“minutamente”), while 
“posthumous” replaces “unpublished” (cf. Selections from the Prison Notebooks [henceforward 
SPN] ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart 1971, pp. 
384-5). 




speculatively, so much so that Croce speaks of a “hidden God”, but 
this concept must, rather, be conceived of historically as an 
 
ensemble of objective conditions which can and must be studied with the 
methods of ‘philology’ and not of ‘speculation’. It must be studied as 
something ‘certain’ that may also be ‘true’ but it must be studied first of all in 
its ‘certainty’ in order for it to be studied as ‘truth’ (Q10I§8, p. 1226).5  
 
Gramsci realized the need for work on Marxism that took its 
inspiration from the approach to the historical method adopted by 
Ernst Bernheim in his volume on historiography and the theory of 
history.6 The work envisaged could take the form of a “a collection 
of immediate criteria, of critical precautions, etc., a philology of 
history and politics as they are conceived by the philosophy of 
praxis” (Q16§3, p. 1845; SPN p. 415). This undertaking would be, 
to a certain extent, a critique of Bukharin and of his partly 
positivistic Marxism. The juxtaposition between statistics and 
philology is inserted in the same conceptual context, which leads 
Gramsci to his reflection on “living philology”; regarding this 
juxtaposition we may note however a non-negligible divarication 
between what is written in November 1930 and in July-August 
1932. In 1930 there seems to be a an anti-empiricist component 
present:  
 
‘Philology’ is the methodological expression of the importance of particular 
facts understood as definite and specific ‘individualities’. This method is 
challenged by another one, namely the method of ‘large numbers’ or ‘statistics’, 
which is borrowed from the natural sciences, or at least from some of them. 
But not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the law of ‘large 
numbers’ can be applied to history and politics only as long as the great masses 
of the population remain passive or are assumed to remain passive […] (Q7§6, 
p. 856; PN Vol. 3 [2007], p. 159).7  
 
In 1932 however Gramsci would write:  
 
                                                 
5 In English in Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks (henceforward FSPN), ed. and trans. D. 
Boothman, London: Lawrence and Wishart 1995, p. 347. 
6 E. Bernheim, Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode, 6th edition (1908 [18891]), Leipzig: Duncker und 
Humblot. 
7 A minor point to note is that the lines quoted here restore the inverted commas that in one 
case are by oversight omitted in the printed version of Joseph Buttigieg’s translation. 




If philology is the methodological expression of the importance of 
ascertaining and precising particular facts in their unique and unrepeatable 
individuality, one cannot however exclude the practical utility of isolating 
certain more general ‘laws of tendency’ corresponding in the political field to 
the laws of statistics or to the law of large numbers which have helped to 
advance various of the natural sciences (Q11§25, p. 1429; SPN, p. 428).  
 
This opening to the ‘laws of tendency’ is consistent with the 
elaboration of a theory of history alternative to positivism, that is to 
the identity between the natural and social sciences, as much as to 
idealism, that is to the Crocean idea that historical prediction is a 
non-sense and has the same epistemological status as gambling. It is 
not by chance that, again in 1932, Gramsci defended Ludovico 
Limentani from the accusations levelled at him by Croce, who had 
liquidated Limentani’s volume La previsione dei fatti storici (The 
Prediction of Historical Facts) in just a few lines. Gramsci’s comment 
[on Croce’s view regarding predictions of the future: trans. note] was: 
“one has the impression that Croce’s reasoning is rather that of a 
literary academic and of one whose phrases are chosen for their 
effect” (Q10II§41VI, p. 1311; FSPN, p. 428).  
Inserted into the articulated theory of history and politics present 
in the Notebooks, there is therefore the concept of “living philology”, 
which is presented as a key concept in the process of reciprocal 
influence between the mass of the people and political leaders, a 
concept supported by the idea of a substitution of a collective 
organism for the leadership of single political representatives. 
Living philology is a difficult concept to fit into one given 
framework, since it involves different spheres of reflection and very 
diversified theoretical notions: it does not constitute the simple 
transfer of philology (that is the methodological expression of the 
importance of particular facts understood as “individualities”, 
defined and rendered precise) into the context of political action, 
but it also calls into the arena a broad vision of history and of 
human beings:  
 
With the extension of mass parties and their organic coalescence with the 
intimate (economic-productive) life of the masses themselves, the process 
whereby popular feeling is standardized ceases to be mechanical and casual 
(that is produced by the conditioning of environmental factors and the like) 
and becomes conscious and critical. Knowledge and a judgment of the 
importance of this feeling on the part of the leaders is no longer the product of 




hunches backed up by the identification of statistical laws, which leaders then 
translate into ideas and words-as-force. (This is the rational and intellectual way 
and is all too often fallacious.) Rather it is acquired by the collective organism 
through ‘active and conscious co-participation’, through ‘com-passionality’,8 
through experience of immediate particulars, through a system which one 
could call ‘living philology’. In this way a close link is formed between great 
mass, party and leading group; and the whole complex, thus articulated, can 
move together as ‘collective-man’  (Q13§25, p. 1430; SPN, p. 429). 
                                                 
8 The hyphenated form is present in Gramsci’s original, drawing attention to the etymological 
roots of “compassion”: . 
